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[A technical note: The English and the French versions of the book are not identical. The French version was published after the English one, and several chapters in the English version are lacking from the French edition. Whenever the equivalent was available in the French version, I noted the English and thereafter the French paginations.]

*L’aventure de la philosophie française depuis les années 1960* (*The adventure of French philosophy*) is a book that could be read rather smoothly, one could almost say in one, enduring breath. It is not one of Badiou’s monumental architectures such as *Théorie du sujet* (1982), *L’être et l’évenement* (1988) or *Logiques des Mondes* (2006), but rather a collection of a variety of his hereto un-published writings, regarding specific questions, specific texts, and most importantly specific authors, all pertaining to the French-writing arena. It is therefore a collection of what one could call *philosophical criticism*, that is to say, an activity of criticism regarding philosophical works belonging to the immediate moment and environment of the critique-philosopher. Indeed philosophical criticism, yet not in the Kantian, systematic sense, but rather in the Diderotian, somewhat impressionistic sense, of local correspondence with
particular products of specific epoch and milieu, in which the critic thinks and judges according to his own interests and concerns. Within this orientation one could suggest that the book operates as a philosophical ‘salon’ in which friends opponents and precursors are present in front of the philosophical critique.

The phenomenon of philosophers writing the history of the philosophical scenery of their own historical framework is an existent genre in the French tradition, and can be traced back to works such as Jean-Philibert Damiron’s 1828 *Les philosophes françaises du xixe siècle* (Damiron 2011) or Félix Ravaisson’s 1867 *La philosophie en France au XIXe siècle* (Ravaisson 1984). Written by philosophers, both books furnished concise overviews of the philosophical scenery of their times, while composing an overall chart being created out of these. Similar to these, *L’adventure* reflects the position of a philosopher embedded in his own historical moment, as well as in his own philosophical tradition, a philosopher who is aware of the historical territory which is being gathered around his own work, around his own thought, around his own figure as well, and being therefore forced to respond, to note, to engage himself in paying tributes, admitting similarities or remarking on essential differences, much more than in announcing opponents or dismissing untenable positions. It could be suggested that from the aspect of its form, this book performs a series of gestures of *philosophical respect*, a respect stemming from the understanding that “Philosophy has as its definition to be that discourse that does not despise any” (as Badiou quotes Guy Lardreau [Badiou 2012a: 298]). All in all, the reader is left with a view of a less militant, perhaps more pacifist image of Badiou than what may be expected. What also becomes clear from this collection is that Badiou reads a lot; he does not shun the accompanying agents in the philosophical scenery in which he himself is active.
Importantly, the book also contains tributes to Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The reserved offering’ (Badiou 2012a: 67-81; Badiou 2012b: 177-207) and to Jacques Rancière (‘Jacques Rancière’s Lessons: Knowledge after the Storm’ [Badiou 2012a: 101-132; Badiou 2012b: 231-266]), two philosophers who are many times considered as suggesting philosophical alternatives to Badiou’s path within the ‘generation’ of French philosophy of the 1980s, consisting of disciples of the ‘post-structuralist moment.’ In the case of Nancy, the decisive differentiating line between him and Badiou passes through the issue of the status of Heidegger and the available means to process the metaphysical disaster he has brought about. In as much as Nancy still practices a hyper-sensitized-Derridean passage through the German tradition, Badiou tries to suggest a way which enables one to go through a different forest altogether.

The conceptual leitmotif of divide between the two philosophers is that of finitude, arriving from the Kantian-Heideggerian trope of thought (Nancy 1990). Against the jargon of finitude which was promulgated by Nancy, Badiou proclaims, in a manner which sums-up rather neatly his challenge to Nancy’s ‘finite thought’:

“What we must urgently break with and put an end to is finitude. In the motif of finitude are concentrated the denial of emancipation, the deadly reign of the pure present, the absence of people to themselves, and the eradication of truths. All this to the benefit, to be sure, of sense – at least as the invasion of sensing, of extreme sensation, which is identical to anaesthesia” (Badiou 2012a: 69-70; Badiou 2012b: 180).

In the case of Rancière, the differentiating line between him and Badiou passes mainly through the question of the validity of socialist democracy, as well as through the question of the relation between aesthetics and artistic production (Rancière 2004: 87-118). In as much as Rancière suggests the social-democratic orientation, posing aesthetics and the ‘partition’ of

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the sensible (Rancière 2000) as standing in the core of politics, Badiou goes in pretty much the opposite political direction with his concept of ‘inaesthetics’ (Badiou 1998) and the ‘senseless character of truth (dimension insensée du vrai)’ (Badiou 2012a: 68; Badiou 2012b: 179); ideologically, Badiou defends the political base of the dictatorship of the proletariat, or ‘aristocratic politics’ (Badiou 2012a:116-117; Badiou 2012b: 249) against the tyranny of democracy. Badiou phrases it thus: “Rancière and I are in agreement on the declared dimension of equality, but we do not share the same hermeneutics with respect to it” (Badiou 2012a:16; Badiou 2012b: 248). Yet in L’adventure Badiou expresses also tacit attention, respect and even admiration for the endeavours and researches of both fellow philosophers. Badiou refers to Nancy as “the loyal man, the last communist, the thinker, the intellectual artist of sensible disparity” (Badiou 2012a: 81; Badiou 2012 b: 191); and as for Rancière, Badiou declares: “Yes, yes- we are brothers. Everyone sees that, and in the end, I do too” (Badiou 2012a: 101; Badiou 2012b: 231). Therefore, criticism as a mixture of interest, suspicion, attentiveness and respect, this is Badiou’s moral approach to his fellow philosophers to be found in L’aventure.

The book also takes upon itself, in its overall composition, a task that I think is fair to refer to as historical; it concentrates on representing Badiou’s attitudes towards his own generation’s philosophy along with reference to the earlier ones. The author’s preface, carrying the same title of the book (Badiou 2012a: lxi-lxiii; Badiou 2012b: 7-25), goes as far as posing basic guidelines for characterizing the history of 20th century French philosophy. Upon concluding the introduction Badiou, writing at this point as a genuine historian of philosophy, points-out six basic characteristics of the French philosophical ‘moment’ (Badiou 2012a: lxi-lxii; Badiou 2012b: 22-23), which are, to the best of my understanding, six intersections inherently modern in their character: (1) The re-unification of concept and existence; (2) the inscription of philosophy within everyday life; (3) unification of knowledge and praxis; (4) the insertion of
the philosophical direction into the political arena; (5) the engagement with the subject subsequent to the psychoanalytic revolution; (6) the resurrection of the 18th century figure of the philosopher-writer. These points arise consistently within *L'aventure*, and the genuinely modern position of Badiou’s point of view is incorporated into his ‘visits’ into the texts of others. By using the term ‘modern’, I mean, in our present context, the one arising out of the challenge the Cartesian gesture posed at the heart and origin of the tradition of French-philosophy, an affiliation which Badiou himself does not explicitly admit, but which is one of the ideas coming to mind from reading *L'aventure* in the light of Badiou’s former works.

One could view the introduction as well as the entire book as a concluding note for numerous publications produced in France during the last decade, most of which are products of the work being carried-out in and around the CIEPFC (Centre International d’Etude de la Philosophie Française Contemporaine) in the École Normale Supérieure in Paris, an institute founded by Badiou and which is also where he delivers his regular seminar. The centre dedicates its activities to a methodical, as well as a metaphysical, revision of the history of the tradition of French philosophy, accompanied by an effort to face, handle and resist the superficial image of this tradition baptized as ‘French theory’ in the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ world (Cusset 2003). Two notable examples of the publications of authors affiliated with this centre and contributing to the construction of the history of French philosophy are Frédéric Worm’s, *La philosophie en France au XXe siècle* (Worms 2009) and the issue of the journal *Philosophie* edited by Camille Riquier (Riquier 2011), titled ‘French philosophie(s)’. The responsibility the CIEPFC takes upon itself is to a large extent a historical one, and Badiou’s *L’Adventure* should also be considered as taking part in this endeavour.

Therefore, one should not look at the endeavour of the ‘Adventure’ book solely as expressing a position of ‘presentism’: rather, Badiou is very much aware of the nature, the issues and the
styles of eloquence of the French tradition with which he aligns himself, and within its borders he works and thinks. Some of the essays concern explicitly earlier generations, such as those discussing Alexandre Kojève and the Hegelian legacy in France (Badiou 2012a: 19-27; Badiou 2012b: 57-64); Jean-Paul Sartre (Badiou 2012a: 53-66; Badiou 2012b: 99-110); or Georges Canguilhem (Badiou 2012a: 39-52; Badiou 2012b: 65-80). These positions and suggestions Badiou analyzes in his usual remarkable lucidity, and as such should not be mis-classified as simplicity.

As this book, fitting to its nature, entails a very wide range of topics that supersede the individual discussion, it seems important to reflect a bit about one such point that becomes evident very clearly: the historical tenor of Badiou’s thought. Indeed, the complex and not self-evidently negative relation of Badiou to history was already noted by both Alberto Toscano (2008) and Quentin Meillassoux (2011). My modest addition to this chain of readings will be to say that it is only against a certain conception of history that Badiou is actually arguing, the one arriving from the post-Kantian, idealist and historicist versions which produced that 20th century octopus known as ‘historicity’ (‘Geschichtlichkeit’). Yet history can be practiced and operated in many other manners other than historicist historicity. Other conceptions of history, those not promoting the substantialization of the ‘Event’ (to use Badiou’s terminology), could fittingly converge with Badiou’s framework. Badiou’s thought, especially as it comes-up in L’aventure, is pregnant with historical capacity. It is applicable and relevant both to the philosophy of history and to the practice of historical inquiries, and it should not be taken at face-value as contra-historical. Indeed, at least two of Badiou’s more recent books, Le siècle (2005) as well as Le reveil de l’histoire (2011) and all his series Circonstances are explicitly occupied with historical dynamics, and they materialize very clearly the fact that Badiou does not disregard history as an area unworthy of the attention of the philosopher. I
will therefore divide the rest of my remarks to several aspects of history arising from Badiou’s thought and capable of being found in the *L’adventure*.

**Historicism and the history of philosophy**

One of the enduring principles of Badiou’s work is its refusal to accept a peaceful cooperation between history and philosophy. Philosophy, from its very nature, is occupied with that which is both true and infinite. One has to differentiate clearly between the research of philosophy and philosophical effectiveness. Badiou specifies:

“As rare as philosophical books are, there are plenty of books ‘of philosophy’. Let us call books ‘of philosophy’ – some of them highly estimable, those that make philosophical texts and references into their *subject matter* by way of commentary, history, explanation promotion or condemnation. Let us call a philosophical book one that proposes a philosophy. No less and no more” (Badiou 2012a: 295).

For Badiou then, if there is truth, being infinite, the investigation proper to it would not be the one emerging from historicist, relativist agendas, reducing the concept of humanity into a flux of temporal flows of events. Rather, truth demands a sort of investigation assuming a philosophical wager, daring to articulate the generic multiple of truth. Following Badiou’s guidelines a history of philosophy could be conceived as a history of adherence to truths; it would be the history of fidelity to truth-procedures. It would consist therefore of an ethical gesture of doubled fidelity, a fidelity to fidelity. In that sense, a philosophy would be not only inherently historical, but also essentially ethical. Recently, Meillassoux (2011: 1) has suggested that for Badiou “there is only history of the eternal, because only the eternal proceeds from
the event.” Meillassoux clarifies to what extent for Badiou the eternal and the historical are actually continuous and not disjunctive terms:

“Truths are eternal and historical, eternal because they are historical: they insist in history, tying together temporal segments across the centuries” (Meillassoux, 2011: 4).

Meillassoux’s suggestion coincides with the point of view of this present review, insisting that Badiou’s philosophy is more relevant to the science of history than perhaps Badiou would have wished it to be. In fact, it is exactly as a way to overcome the deadlock of historicism that Badiou’s philosophy should be re-examined.

**Adherence to Generic multiples**

According to Badiou, history is to be detected only by generic procedures of Art, Love, Science and Politics, as post-evental adherence or fidelity. Therefore, to repeat, if there would be a history (as for Badiou the communist ‘History’ as such does not exist’ [Badiou 1982: 110]), then this history would be that which is construed as a series of post-evental truths. Philosophy, in that sense, is history itself, in as much as it is told as a series of scissions and the given-accounts of generic multiples. Therefore, the importance of the vocabulary revolving around the terms ‘genre’ and ‘generic’ is decisive for an understanding of Badiou’s stance versus history. This is evident for example in Badiou’s reading of Lyotard’s *le differend*, when stating:

“For politics, as well as for philosophy- precisely because their vocation is the safeguarding of the occurrence, the vigilance over the opening of the ‘Is it happening?’ – there is no equality of occurrences. This is a serious difference
with *The Differend*. I posit that what an event destroys in the genre in which it is phrased (hence the need for it to be two: inscribed and exscribed) measures the power of the scission, the singularity of the occurrence [*la singularité de l’occurrence*].

‘What it destroys’ means: the dysfunction of the genre’s capacity to count the Two as One, to anticipate the sum of the generic scission” (Badiou 2012a:238; Badiou 2012b: 159-160).

Philosophy isn’t, therefore, according to Badiou, generative of truths, but rather, its task is to adhere to a truth, or rather to a ‘compossibility’ of generic procedures (Badiou 1999: 37; Badiou 1989: 18), and to endure with these; it is itself an ethical adherence to truth. The task of the philosopher is to deduce the *generic multiplicity* that makes the truth of the event. One of the clearest articulations of this is to be found in *Manifesto for Philosophy* (Badiou 1999: 105; Badiou 1989: 86-7), where Badiou identifies between a truth of a generic situation and its generic multiplicity. For Badiou, ‘generic’ testifies to all that is not singular in the singularity of the productive, generative procedure. Badiou explains the nature of the generic multiple:

“The central category here is generic multiplicity. It founds the Platonism of the multiple by letting us think a truth both as a multiple-result of a singular procedure, and as a hole, or subtraction, in the field of the nameable. It makes it possible to take on an ontology of the pure multiple without renouncing truth and without having to recognize the constituting nature of language variation. It is, in addition, the framework of thinking space wherein the four conditions of philosophy can be gathered and located as compossible. The poem, the matheme, inventive politics and love in their contemporary state are in fact nothing but the actual regimes of production, in multiple situations, of generic
multiples making truth of these situations” (Badiou 1999:104-105; Badiou 1989: 86-7).

Another way to put the same principle, is that history poses problems, whose answers cannot come from history itself, but rather must come from the infinite insertion of fidelity, brought about, most of all, by the generic rationality conceived by the philosopher (Badiou 2011: 65).

**History as adventure and not as testimony**

One of the important chapters in *L’aventure*, especially regarding the question which interests us here, is the one regarding Paul Ricoeur’s book *La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli* (Seuil, 2000), “The subject supposed to be a Christian” (Badiou 2012a: 321-336; Badiou 2012b: 81-98). In this chapter it becomes clearer, I think, what kind of history is unacceptable for Badiou: it is history as it is told by the figurations and pre-figurations of sin, forgiveness and salvation which is suggested by the Christian (and, naturally, Hegelian) model of history. What summarizes Ricoeur's moral standpoint, Badiou says, is the proposition that “you are worth more than your acts” (Badiou 2012a: 335; Badiou 2012b: 98), promoting a Christian metaphysics of the human-as-holy. Contrary to this position, for Badiou, the value of historical occurrence is to be detected according to the division and dispersion of a generic multiple across the compositing elements of an event, which are wholly inscribed in the level of action. The Christian conception of the historical existence of humankind always preserves some remnant of his godly and therefore forgivable and redeemable nature, external to any action, in as much as Badiou insists on the generic, wholly contingent nature of the relation between subject and history, leaning on the primary status of acts and actions, and here is Badiou’s contra-dictum to Ricoeur’s: “It can happen, rarely, that your acts are worth more
than you” (Badiou 2012a: 335; Badiou 2012b: 98). History, for Badiou, is therefore a tale of rarities of efforts. Badiou insists on an atheist ontology of history of acts, in which no totality transcends the overall structure, and in which a subject is only the result of the adherence operated by and with generic procedures: political, artistic, amorous, or scientific. History is therefore a meta-subjective tale of rarities. See what Badiou says in chapter 10, dealing with Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s Anti-Oedipe:

“Masses make history; practice comes first with respect to theory. Therefore there is a leftover of ‘pure’ practice, the historical rupture as such, which historical materialism and theory will not be fully able either to deduce or to organize any longer, because their deductions and their organizing principles presuppose it as fact. This reminder, however, is neither the cause nor the hidden essence. It is not at all unknowable: it is an infinite historical source, at least throughout a historical period governed by the same principal contradiction” (Badiou 2012a: 174).

Badiou therefore suggests thinking of an ‘infinite historical’ reservoir which never belongs exclusively to ‘someone’. In all four cases of generation of truths – the poem, the matheme, politics and love – History is something which occurs as subject, that is to say, when one is found, somewhere and at a certain moment, to have been taking part in a truth procedure.
Scissions instead of sublime Judgments: Kantianism and its aftermath

One of the distinctive characters of Badiou’s readings in *L’aventure*, is the contra-Kantian sensitivity. In many of the chapters Badiou concentrates on issues and problems emerging from Kantian presuppositions, while in others the connection is subtle; either way, reference to the ‘Kantian-problem’ can be found in most chapters. Thus, for example, regarding Ricoeur, Badiou states: “The question of the subject, of his identity and of the separability of this identity, only emerges – and this is good old post-Kantian logic – with moral judgment” (Badiou 2012a: 331; Badiou 2012b: 92). It is upon this statement, in fact, that Badiou bases his criticism of Ricoeur’s book. Though Badiou declares, in *L’aventure* as well as elsewhere in his writings, that passing through the Kantian imperatives is not a necessity of the philosophy of our age (Badiou 2012a: 290; Badiou 2012b: 174) it seems that in *L’aventure* Badiou demonstrates what are the consequences of many sorts of adherences to the Kantian channels of thought. It seems that Badiou is pointing to a connection between the importance of judgment and the abyss of historicity that was offered by the Copernican revolution. For Badiou, even Deleuze’s philosophy, with whose work Badiou engaged also elsewhere (Badiou 2007), should after all be read within a Kantian framework:

“Deleuze would like to be to Kant what Marx is to Hegel. Deleuze flips Kant upside down; the categorical imperative – but a desiring one, the unconditional – but materialist; the autonomy of the subject – but like a running flow” (Badiou 2012a: 179).

In the case of chapter 15, in discussing Monique David-Ménard’s *La folie dans la raison pure: Kant lecteur de Swedenborg* (Vrin 1990), the dismantling of the Kantian paradigm is evident. At one point, while analyzing David-Ménard’s work through his own sensitivities, Badiou states:
“…the Kantian doctrine of the object is captive to a logic that, by the foreclosure of the void in its ontological sense, misses precisely the point of the heterogeneous and prepares the rehabilitation of the imperatives of religious morality” (Badiou 2012a: 277).

Neo-religious morality, for Badiou is one of the most dangerous deadlocks of late-modern ideology (perhaps, this could be the reason why, from all philosophers of his ‘generation’, the name of the great Christian philosopher Jean-Luc Marion is never mentioned in *L'aventure*). Badiou’s contra-Kantian stance is raised perhaps more bluntly in chapter 16, ‘On François Proust, Kant: The Tone of History,’ which revolves around the relation between the Kantian sublime and the model of history from which it drew its principles. In the heart of the discussion stands this definition by Proust: “Let us consider, for example, this strong definition of history: ‘History is the collection or recollection of sublime experience of liberty’ (Badiou 2012a: 21-294; Badiou 2012b: 163-176). What Badiou finds lacking in the account Proust gives of the Sublime source of history of liberty is its foundation on finitude. Instead, Badiou writes:

“The extra-ordinary is finite, inasmuch as the ordinary is infinite. And, moreover, the traced (or named) disappearance of the event, the immanent stigma of its abolition, summons in its turn the haphazard becoming of a fidelity that is in principle infinite, quite simply because this becoming – what I call the truth procedure – could not have any interior limitation: it ‘works’ within a situation that, like any other, is infinite. (...) This is why I say that it is a generic infinity [*infinite générique*]” (Badiou 2012a: 289; Badiou 2012b: 172).
In other words, Badiou aligns the ordinary with the infinite fidelity worthy of a truth. History would then be an ordinary, infinite source of adherence, which is itself, to continue working with Badiouian terminology, a generator, a non-limited capacity for thought. That which is finite, is exactly the ‘event’ itself, arriving as a cut, a scission (perhaps one could say, a figure?), a discontinuous intermission in the continuous flow supported by pre-sedimented habitus of the infinite abundance of the ordinary. What kind of history may result from that shift in methodic schemes?

**Badiou’s generic history**

Badiou no doubt is then interested in history, moreover in *infinite history*, and is interested, as well, more concretely, in locating his own thought within the *longue durée* of the history of French philosophy. The reading through *L’aventure* allows one to suggest that Badiou’s anti-historicism (Toscano 2008: 23) paves the way for a re-union between history and philosophy, a re-union of an anti-historicist, non-Kantian sort.

When one follows Badiou’s guidelines noted above, one is being lead to the conclusion that for Badiou all philosophy is philosophy of history. And this philosophy of history is no less than an elastic, complex, un-expected trail of post-evental adherence to rarities which make themselves discontinuous ‘moments’, detachable linguistically after a work of thought, yet wholly continuous and internal to the surface of occurrences. Rarity, as such, has as its immanent principle to be both necessarily inscribed and ex-scribed on the map of history. Following Badiou’s formulations, we would offer to think of history as based on generic dynamics and mechanics, or rather on what Badiou calls ‘genericity’, and explains:
“The concept of genericity [généricité] is introduced to give an account of the effects, internal to a multiple-situation, of an event supplementing it. It designates the status of certain multiplicities, which are simultaneously inscribed [s’inscrivent] in a situation and consistently weave within it chance irreversibly subtracted from all forms of naming [soustrait à toute nomination]. This multiple-intersection of the regulated consistency of a situation and the eventful randomness supplementing it is quite precisely the locus of a truth of the situation. This truth results from an infinite procedure. What we can say of it is only, assuming the completion of the procedure, that it ‘will have been’ generic, or Indiscernible” [elle « aura été » générique, ou indiscernable] (Badiou 1999: 105; Badiou 1989: 88).

Without getting here into a detailed analysis of the Badiou-esque concept of ‘genericity,’ one should yet note its character of ‘simultaneity’ (I’d prefer this term rather than ‘undecidability’ or ‘ambivalence’). To adhere philosophically to a generic rarity means to work necessarily within language and simultaneously to force language to ‘admit’ that which is pure subtraction, indiscernible, that is to say, a hereto un-classified contingency, that is to say a rarity within a genre.

Can the concept of ‘adventure’ be used as a model for a philosophy of history? I would suggest this as a worthy question coming out of the reading of L’aventure. My thought is that adventure, as the atomic form of the concept of ‘venture,’ brings up the risk one has to take in order to take a part in a subject, that is to say to ethically adhere to the generic multiple, or truth, of the event. In fact I find that a more thorough comparative analysis should be done to clarify the nature of the inter-relations between Badiou’s concept of genericity and Henri Bergson’s concept of duration (Durée). Like Badiou’s ‘generation,’ Bergson’s duration, with
its mutations and nuances, calls for adherence; like Badiou’s generation, the mutations of the Bergsonian duration are at the same time ‘in-scribed’ and ‘ex-scribed’ in pre-given spatial schemes and habitudes. In this, this kind of analysis would suggest a reading of Bergson in a non-Deleuzian, Badiou-esque manner. This reading may also permit one to affiliate Badiou even more rigorously with the French tradition to which he anyway adheres.

Upon concluding, I allow myself a philologically based, but I hope nevertheless relevant, remark: Badiou, throughout his work, insists on the use of the concept of the ‘event’. This is a tribute to the German Idealist and then Heideggerian tradition, which is, perhaps, unnecessary. While following Badiou’s insights regarding a new discipline of history, perhaps indeed toned by a philologist’s tedious and nagging gaze, I wonder whether the use of the term-category ‘event’ (événement) is indeed the most suitable term to choose in order to best present Badiou’s suggestions regarding the nature of history? This term carries within itself an enormous baggage of distracting and oppressive post-Kantian, idealist and Heideggerian tradition of ‘Ereignis,’ indeed, standing in-line with the historicist tradition of pure eventful, ontologized temporality. By using this term, Badiou ties his thought with a tradition that he wishes to refute. Would it not be perhaps more accurate, and adequate to the tradition to which Badiou adheres, to use, for example, one of Badiou’s own others terms, such as ‘generation’ instead of ‘event’ in order to refer to that very mutation, in-and-ex-scribed on the maps of history? Badiou’s philosophy, as any real philosophy, delivers more than it seeks to, making some of his own terms redundant for the ones attentive to the generic multiple to which his work pertains.
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